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T HE NEW CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT 1985' was proclaimed
into force on December 4, 1985. It has far-reaching goals. It
seeks to take Canada's criminal justice system into the realm of con-
temporary criminal activities, and includes a wide range of crimes
from domestic offences such as impaired driving and boating and
computer crime to international concerns such as hostage-taking and
offences against nuclear material.
The Act is mammoth, comprising 212 sections and five annexes.
The aim of this short analysis is to discuss only the main provisions
that concern international criminal law, notably the offence of
hostage-taking and offences against nuclear material.'
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
DISTINGUISHED
As a preliminary step it is important to distinguish between
international and transnational criminal law.
International criminal law, strictly speaking, includes all criminal
offences that have been proscribed by the international community
through customary and conventional international law. For example,
in the last twenty-two years we have witnessed the attempts made
*Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
' S.C., 1985, c. sg. Note especially ss. 5 and 41.
2 There are other amendments in the 1985 Act but they mainly clarify existing
sections. For example, see ss. 6(1-2), 387.1, and 388 offences against inter-
nationally protected persons; 58(2) re false statements in relation to passports
and ss. 423()(a), 423(3-6) re conspiracy.
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by the international community, under the auspices of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, to curtail terrorist activities.
Hijackings, other attacks upon civil aviation,4 attacks on diplomats
and other internationally protected persons,' hostage-taking, and
offences against nuclear material7 are the most prominent inter-
national offences of this generation. Prior generations have borne
the brunt of two world wars and countless other armed conflicts
of a national or international character and upon those they put
their stigmatization, branding as international criminals and the
enemies of mankind the perpetrators of crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Condemnation and control of offences against the universal public
policy may be in the form of a multilateral treaty setting down
obligations upon states parties to utilize wide bases of jurisdiction
over the offence and to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere, aut
judicare) the alleged offenders. Upon ratification, states would
assume these obligations and would be required to act in good faith.
Transnational criminal law is completely different, although it is
sometimes fallaciously termed "international." The offences are or-
dinary common law crimes and the only international connotation
is that there are one or more foreign elements. On account of the
fact that two or more states are involved in some way, there may
be international ramifications even though the offences are not pro-
scribed by customary or conventional international law. The offen-
ces, common crimes in nature, simply traverse international bound-
aries. The international legal rules help to identify the bases of
jurisdiction over the offence and the method of accquisition of juris-
diction over the person. However, once seized of a case, the courts
of the forum will apply domestic criminal law if in fact they have
3 See the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts on Aircraft,
1963, 1970, Can. T.S. No. 5 and the Hague Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970, 1972, Can. T.S. No. 23.
4 See the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971, 1973, Can. T.S. No. 6.
5 See the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons including diplomatic agents (1974) 13
Int'l. Leg. Mat. 41.
6 The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979, re-
printed in (1979) 18 Int'l. Leg. Mat. 1456.
7 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1979, re-
printed in (1979) 18 Int'l. Leg. Mat. 1419, 1422-31.
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jurisdiction over the person and a jurisdictional basis over the offence
in domestic criminal law.
INCORPORATION INTO CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW
In Canada, it is necessary for offences to be incorporated into the
Criminal Code or other relevant penal legislation, as section 8 of the
Code provides that "no person shall be convicted of ... an offence
at common law." It follows that international criminal offences that
are proscribed by the international community through the establish-
ment of rules of customary international law or international con-
ventions are not part of Canadian criminal law until implementation
by way of amendment to the Criminal Code or other relevant statute
has taken place.
When Canada signs an international convention dealing with
international crimes, the usual practice is to delay ratification until
the amending legislation has been enacted. This ensures compliance
domestically before the international obligations are assumed. Natur-
ally, many criminal offences may have a domestic equivalent. For
example, a terrorist hostage-taking and intentional killing could be
looked at as kidnapping' and murder. If the offences had taken
place in Canada there would be no question concerning our court's
jurisdiction over them. However, today's criminals, especially those
of the terrorist persuasion, do not tend to commit an offence in a
state and remain in that state. They seek refuge abroad.
In order to enable Canada to participate effectively in the erad-
ication of international criminal offences such as terrorism, the
Criminal Code has had to be amended to allow for jurisdiction over
the offence in a wide variety of circumstances. This is one of the key
features and obligations of all anti-terrorist conventions. The other
is the extradite or prosecute provision. Should a state for some
reason be unable or unwilling to extradite a fugitive offender present
in its territory and charged with such heinous offences in other states,
it must as a back-up itself have the power to prosecute. Without this
provision the fugitive would go scot-free.
All the conventions therefore provide that states parties shall es-
tablish the stated offences and jurisdiction over them in their
domestic legislation.'" The bases of jurisdiction in all the conventions
8 See s. 247 Criminal Code.
9 See ss. 212 and 247, Criminal Code.
10 The language concerning penalties and submission to authorities for purposes
of prosecution differs between the conventions.
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can be summed up as follows: (a) crimes committed within the
territory, including ships or aircraft registered in the state; (b) the
active nationality principle, which provides for jurisdiction based
on the alleged offender having the nationality of the state assuming
jurisdiction; (c) the passive personality principle, whereby the
victim's state of nationality takes jurisdiction; and (d) the presence
of the alleged offender after the commission of the offence abroad
in the state seeking to prosecute being sufficient connection."
Canada, in general, bases its jurisdiction over the offence on the
territorial principle of jurisdiction. Section 5(2) of the Criminal
Code provides in this context that no one shall be prosecuted in
Canada for an offence committed outside of Canada, unless it is
expressly provided for in the Code itself or other Act of Parliament.
As a result Canada has had to make such exceptions to the basic
territorial approach by amending the Criminal Code to incorporate
the offences and these wider bases of jurisdiction, including the
presence of the alleged offender within Canada.
THE CONVENTION APPROACH
Modem terrorist tactics show no respect for international borders
and state sovereignty. Although often it is the military, heads of
state, and other civil servants who are the preferred targets of attack,
many innocent civilians find themselves at risk or, worse, maimed,
killed as mere bystanders, or taken hostage as demonstrated in the
hijacking of the Egypt Air aircraft to Malta and in the taking of
the cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985. Platitudes such as "one per-
son's terrorist is another's liberator" are false and misleading. The
terrorist causes terror to the general populace. To gain publicity for
his or her cause, to invoke fear of the repercussions if demands short-
and long-term are not met, the terrorist wreaks havoc in diverse
countries regardless of the consequences to life and limb.
A progression can be seen in the types of terrorist acts that have
taken place in the last twenty years or so. Hijacking was the fashion
in the i96o's and 197o's, resulting in adoption by member states
of the International Civil Aviation Organization of the Tokyo,'
" This is comparable to some extent to the concept of universal jurisdiction
over enemies of mankind, enabling any state managing to get control over
the person the right to prosecute.
12 Supra note 3.
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Hague,"3 and Montreal" Conventions. Attacks on diplomats and
other internationally protected persons and hostage-taking have be-
come prime areas of concern, resulting in adoption by the United
Nations of the 1974 New York Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons' 5
and the 1979 Hostage-Taking Convention. 6 The fear that has
become apparent today is that there are other extremely sensitive
areas susceptible to the terrorist whim. Nuclear installations, nuclear
material, and explosive devices could if seized be used to hold not
only individuals but governments hostage by the threat of unreas-
oned use. In a similar vein the terrorist threat could centre on other
types of installation crucial to the population of a country. Contam-
inants could be fed into a major city's water supply. Hydro facilities
could be put out of order and force the chaos of a black-out to
occur. Demands could be made and a huge segment of the popu-
lation terrorized, particularly if the media aids the terrorist cause
by indiscriminate reporting.
This is not the time to dwell upon the internationalization of
terrorism, but it should be emphasized that many terrorist organiz-
ations give each other assistance and certain states act as safe havens
or give actual aid and training. In order to eradicate terrorism -
or if this does not occur to prosecute the offenders - it is necessary
to have wholesale application of the multilateral treaties that deal
with the offences. It is useless if only the victim states are obligated.
It is also essential that the most elastic bases of jurisdiction are used
to give as many states as possible the grounds upon which to base
a prosecution.
HOSTAGE-TAKING AND OFFENCES AGAINST NUCLEAR MATERIAL
The two most recent international attempts at combatting terrorist
offences have been the Hostage-Taking Convention of 19797 and
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of
i98o. They respond to the currently perceived threats to inter-
national society. It will be seen in the pages that follow that the two
13 Ibid.
14 Supra note 4.
15 Supra note 5.
16 Supra note 6.
17 Ibid.
IS Supra note 7.
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conventions to an extent adopt a similar approach based on earlier
models already mentioned. From a Canadian perspective, their
implementation into domestic criminal law has raised a few contro-
versies. As will be seen, four questions raised are: ( i ) does the 1985
act in its bases of jurisdiction go beyond the conventions and seek a
basis of prosecution not validated by conventional or customary
international law; (2) do the provisions creating the offence of
conspiracy violate international law; (3) does the drafting of the
sections lack clarity; and (4) could an accused prosecuted under the
new sections argue that they are in breach of sections 7 and i i (g)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
Hostage-Taking
The aim of the Hostage-Taking Convention is to deal with
hostage-taking of all individuals and not just the internationally
protected persons covered by the earlier Convention. The Conven-
tion defines the offence in Article I as follows:
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to
continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the
"hostage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an inter-
national intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person,
or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence
of taking of hostages ("hostage taking") within the meaning of this
Convention.
Attempts and participation as an accomplice are covered.1" States
parties are obliged to make the listed types of offences punishable by
appropriate penalties which recognize the grave nature of the
crimes.' Because a state in which a hostage-taking incident has
occurred is in a delicate position vis-a-vis other concerned states,
Article 3 states:
i. The State Party in the territory of which the hostage is held by the
offender shall take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the
situation of the hostage, in particular, to secure his release and, after
his release to facilitate, when relevant, his departure.
2. If any object which the offender has obtained as a result of the
taking of hostages comes into the custody of a State Party, that State
Party shall return it as soon as possible to the hostage or the third party
19 Supra note 6, Art. 1(2).
20 Ibid., Art. 2.
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referred to in article i, as the case may be, or to the appropriate
authorities thereof.
As with hijacking and attacks on internationally protected persons,
international co-operation is perhaps the only method to suppress
and deter such occurrences. Illegal activities of individuals, groups
of individuals, or organizations that encourage, instigate, organize,
or participate in hostage-taking must be prohibited.2 ' Co-operation
needs to be co-ordinated to be effective.22
Article 5 sets out the usual basis of jurisdiction over the offence.
It states:
i. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over any of the offences set forth in article i
which are committed:
(a) in its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that state;
(b) by any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate,
by those stateless persons who have their habitual residence in its
territory;
(c) in order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any
act; or
(d) with respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that
State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article i in
cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does
not extradite him to any of the States mentioned in paragraph i of
this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exer-
cised in accordance with internal law.
Besides the usual bases of jurisdiction in this type of convention
based on territory, registration of aircraft and shipping, passive and
active nationality, and presence within the territory, the Hostage-
Taking Convention has two novel features. First, it provides that a
state may assume jurisdiction over habitual residents of its territory
who are stateless and second, that it may do so where it is made the
target of a hostage-taking offence. Noteworthy also is that the Con-
vention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with international law.
21 Ibid., Art. 4(a).
22 Ibid., Art. 4 (b).
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Article 8 provides for the extradite or prosecute concept. It is
couched in stronger terms than the Internationally Protected Persons
Convention," in that the decision to prosecute must be done in the
same manner as for grave ordinary domestic offences.
Article 9 has a type of non-refoulement obligation which aroused
some opposition.24 Article I4 recognizes that nothing in the Con-
vention shall justify violation of the territorial integrity or political
independence of a state in contravention of the United Nations
Charter. This is seen as an "Anti-Entebbe" clause. This article and
Article I2, both of which deal with situations concerning national
liberation movements, are compromises whose meaning, in the mind
of this writer, is open to debate. These articles illustrate the problems
of making an agreement at the international level. The lowest com-
mon denominator therefore may be sufficiently abstract or ambig-
uous to be agreed upon.
The Convention has not yet come into force. Canada signed it
on February i9, I980. 2' Before ratification, it was necessary to
amend the Criminal Code to provide for the offence and jurisdiction
over it. The 1985 Criminal Law Amendment Act 26 does just that.
The new sections 247(2) and 247.1 of the Code provided by this
1985 Act establish the new offence of hostage-taking and provide
for punishment. Section 6(1.3) of the Code now stipulates that
Canada will utilize expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction over the
designated offence. It provides for the usual exception to section
5(2) by stating that:
Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act, every one who,
outside Canada, commits an act or omission that if committed in
Canada would be an offence against section 247. 1 shall be deemed to
commit that act or omission in Canada if
(a) the act or omission is committed on a ship that is registered or
licensed, or for which an identification number has been issued, pur-
suant to any Act of Parliament;
(b) the act or omission is committed on an aircraft
(i) registered in Canada under regulations made under the Aero-
nautics Act, or
2s Supra note 5.
24 See Sharon Williams and J.-G. Castel, Canadian Criminal Law: Inter-
national and Transactional Aspects, at 208 (1981).
25 P.C. i98o-345, Feb. I, 198o.
26 Supra note i, s. 5.
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(ii) leased without crew and operated by a person who is qualified
under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act to be registered
as owner of an aircraft in Canada under such regulations;
(c) the person who commits the act or omission
(i) is a Canadian citizen, or
(ii) is not a citizen of any state and ordinarily resides in Canada;
(d) the act or omission is committed with intent to induce Her Majesty
in right of Canada or of a province to commit or cause to be committed
any act or omission;
(e) a person taken hostage by the act or omission is a Canadian citizen;
or
(f) the person who commits the act or omission is, after the com-
mission thereof, present in Canada.
The implementing sections give rise to some comment. Section
6 (1.3) confers jurisdiction on Canadian courts not only where the
act or omission occurred outside Canada on a ship or aircraft regis-
tered in Canada as is laid down in the 1979 Hostage-Taking Con-
vention, but also in the case of ships licensed in Canada and aircraft
leased to a person qualified to be registered as an owner in Canada.
Both of these provisions go beyond Article 5 of the Convention
that obligates states parties to take such measures as may be neces-
sary to establish jurisdiction over the offences of hostage-taking that
are committed, among other things, in its territory or on board an
aircraft or ship registered in that state. The question that arises is
whether a prosecution entertained on the basis of such licence or
lease contained in section 6 (1.3) of the Criminal Code would vio-
late international law. It should be noted that the same issue arises
in implementation of the Protection of Nuclear Material Convention
contained in section 6(1.7) (a) and (b). The Law Reform Com-
mission of Canada" takes the position that it would violate inter-
national law, at least in cases concerning foreigners. It is argued
furthers that Article 5(3) of the 1979 Convention states that the
Convention does not exclude any jurisdiction exercised in accordance
with international law. The Commission takes the position that
Article 5(3) "envisages that the internal criminal law of a state
complies with international law."' This writer is of the same view.
Article 5 (3) logically would seem to refer to the exercise of juris-
27 Working Paper No. 37, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (1984), at 94-95.
2 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 94.
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diction that flows from rights granted to states under international
law.
It is a provision in section 6(1.3) (b) (ii) that causes the most
difficulty. Jurisdiction will be taken on the basis of the status of the
lessee and operator of an aircraft. Envisage the following scenario:
X qualified under Canadian law to be registered in Canada as an
owner of aircraft leases and operates in France a French aircraft for
use in Europe. This aircraft, crewed by French citizens and carrying
only persons of different European nationalities, is commandeered
by a Palestinian who takes the Europeans hostage. Canada's con-
nection here would appear minimal. Of course, should the Canadian
lessee/operator be a party to the hostage-taking he would be covered
by the nationality principle in section 6 (I.3) (c) (i). The passive
personality principle would not be relevant unless the lessee/operator
was a victim, as provided in section 6(1.3) (e). The protective
principle would not be useful unless the federal government or the
provinces were the target states, as contained in section 6(1.3) (d).
The conclusion that could be reached is that this extension of
jurisdiction by Canada beyond that provided in the 1979 Conven-
tion and beyond any rules of customary international law would
violate our current international obligations to respect the sovereignty
of other states and not extend without justification our jurisdiction
extraterritorially. It could be contended by any person brought to
trial in Canada that these sections contravene section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"° and that as such the
basis of prosecution is invalid. It could also be argued that these
sections could constitute an infringement of section i i (g) of the
Charter, which provides that any person charged with an offence
has the right:
not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at
the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under
Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada is of the view that there
may be a contravention of section i i (g) in those instances where
the "extraterritorial conduct is not an offence as of the time it occurs
30 Constitution Act 1982, Part I, which is Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982,
1982, c. i i (U.K.), s. 7 provides that: "Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
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but only subsequently when the accused comes to Canada."'" One
author argues that:
given the reference in subsection i (g) of the Charter and to inter-
national criminal law, the reference in section 7 to principles of fund-
amental justice, and the general power of the courts under section 52
to examine the validity of legislation, it may also be that, at least as
far as a person's rights under criminal law are concerned the courts
would strike down proposed [as it then was] section 6(1.3) (b) (ii) as
contrary to international law, or construe it "strictly as applying only
in accordance with international law."3' 2
The only apparent argument that can be proffered is that similar
provisions can be found concerning lessees in the Hague33 and
Montreal 4 Conventions. Can such similarly worded articles allowing
jurisdiction based on the close connection between state and lessee
justify the assumption that such a basis has developed since the
adoption of these Conventions in 197o and 1971 respectively into
a general rule of customary international law? It is relevant to note
that as of April 1984 there were i2 1 states parties to the Hague
Convention and i 19 states parties to the Montreal Convention. This
writer would contend that these acceptances by the majority of states
demonstrates a sufficient generality and consistency of state practice
and opinio juris to evidence a rule of customary international law.
Also, it would seem that the suggestion made by Mr. Simpson of
the Law Reform Commission of Canada overlooks the fact that
section i i (g) of the Charter does stipulate that the act or omission
must at the time of its commission have been an offence under
Canadian law or international law or was recognized by the com-
munity of nations." Even if the offence of hostage-taking were
simply a product of treaty and not recognized in customary inter-
national law or the general principles of law, it would be sufficient
if it were an offence in Canada. The word "or" is used twice in
section i i (g). It is not necessary for the offence to be one under
both Canadian and international systems. Of relevance too is the fact
that Mr. Simpson in his article and the Law Reform Commission in
31 Supra note 27, at 95.
8' Simpson, "Hostage-Taking and Nuclear Material," (1984) t6 Ottawa L.
Rev. 342, at 347.
33 Supra note 3, Art. 4(1) (c).
34 Supra note 4, Art. 5(1)(c).
35 My emphasis.
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its Working Paper argue that the jurisdiction provision falls foul of
section i I (g). Section i i (g) addresses solely the offence and not the
jurisdictional basis.
The Canadian courts if faced by these arguments would, it is
submitted, hold that the offence of hostage-taking is abhorrent to
the community of nations. The concensus is to take steps to eradicate
it. To prosecute on the basis of jurisdiction listed in Article 5 (1.3)
of the Criminal Code, although going beyond the 1979 Convention,
would not violate the principles of fundamental justice.
Two other queries can be raised. The first is whether or not the
basis of jurisdiction over the offence hinging on the presence of the
offender is legitimate and second whether or not the provisions on
conspiracy"6 that go beyond conventional international law are
contestable. Both issues will be addressed in the following section,
as they also relate to the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
Protection under International Criminal Law of Nuclear Material
Nuclear material and nuclear facilities might well present them-
selves as targets and in effect be used to hold governments and
populations hostage until demands are met. Apart from terrorism,
if physical protection is not adequate on a world-wide basis any
unauthorized individuals or groups could divert nuclear materials
or sabotage facilities.
The responsibility for the establishment and operation of a
physical protection system is within the competence and authority
of a state. However, it is still a matter of concern to other states as
to whether the responsibility for protection is being lived up to. It is
a question therefore of concern and co-operation,"7 especially when
material is to be transported across international borders.
In recognizing the problems, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) realized that it had a role to play in promoting
protection and international co-operation.' In 1980, the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted in
36 As hostage-taking under section 24.7 (2) of the Code is an indictable offence,
ss. 423(3) and (4) apply.
37 See S. Eklund, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
in his preface to "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," June 1977,
INF CIRC/22 5 /Rev. j.
38 Ibid.
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Vienna. 9 It is not yet in force.4 Canada signed the Convention on
September 22, i98o, and the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1985
provides in new section 6( 1.4-1.8) for implementation of domestic
jurisdiction over offences involving nuclear material that are neces-
sary to be in place so that Canada can meet the international
obligations and hence ratify the Convention.
The amendment to the Criminal Code follows closely the 198o
Convention. Nuclear material is defined. Section 6(1.8) provides:
For the purposes of this section, "nuclear material" means
(a) plutonium, except plutonium with an isotopic concentration of
plutonium-238 exceeding eighty per cent,
(b) uranium-233,
(c) uranium containing uranium-233 or uranium-235 or both in such
an amount that the abundance ratio of the sum of those isotopes to
the isotope uranium-238 is greater than 0.72 per cent,
(d) uranium with an isotopic concentration equal to that occurring in
nature, and
(e) any substance containing anything described in paragraphs (a)
to (d),
but does not include uranium in the form of ore or ore-residue.
The thrust of the Convention is to apply to nuclear material certain
levels of protection. States parties are obliged to take appropriate
steps within their national law and consistent with international law
to ensure that as far as practicable such material is protected,
whether it is within its territory or on board a ship or aircraft under
its jurisdiction that is engaged in transport to or from that state.4 '
It seems to provide, among other things, for co-operation and assist-
ance to the maximum feasible extent where theft, robbery, or other
unlawful taking of nuclear material occurs, or where there is a cred-
ible threat thereof.
42
States agree to make the intentional commission of offences deal-
ing with nuclear material, as provided in the Convention, punishable
under their domesic laws."3 Such offences are to be punishable by
"appropriate penalties"" which take into account the grave nature
39 March 3, ig8o. See supra note 7.
40 Ibid. By Art. i9 it requires 21 ratifications, acceptances, or approvals.
41 Ibid., Art. 3.
42 Ibid., Art 5(2).
43 Ibid., Art. 7().
44Ibid., Art. 7(2).
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of the offences. Jurisdiction is to be established on the widest number
of bases," including the presence of the offender within the terri-
tory.46 The Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law.4 ' Article 9 is essential in
that it provides that states parties must take appropriate measures,
including detention under its national laws, to ensure the presence
of the offender for the purposes of prosecution or extradition. There
shall be extradition or submission to the local authorities for the
purposes of prosecution, "without exception whatsoever and without
undue delay. '48 One unusual feature is that the states parties agree
to give each other all necessary assistance with respect to criminal
proceedings concerning offences under the Convention. This assist-
ance includes supplying evidence. However, the law of the state that
is the subject of the request shall apply. 9
Canada's obligations under the Convention are to be met in the
1985 Act. Section 6 of the Criminal Code of Canada as amended
states:
(1.4) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act, where
(a) a person outside Canada receives, has in his possession, uses, trans-
fers the possession of, sends or delivers to any person, transports, alters,
disposes of, disperses or abandons nuclear material and thereby
(i) causes or is likely to cause the death of, or serious bodily harm
to, any person, or
(ii) causes or is likely to cause serious damage to, or destruction of,
property, and
(b) the act or omission described in paragraph (a) would, if commit-
ted in Canada, be an offence against this Act,
that person shall be deemed to commit that act of omission in Canada
if paragraph (1.7) (a), (b) or (c) applies in respect of the act or
omission.
(.5) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act, everyone
who, outside Canada, commits an act or omission that if committed
in Canada would constitute
(a) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit,
(b) being an accessory after the fact in relation to, or
45 Ibid., Art. 8.
46 Ibid., Art. 8(2).
47 Ibid., Art. 8(3).
" Ibid., Art. io.
49 Ibid., Art. 13.
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(c) counselling in relation to,
an act or omission that is an offence by virtue of subsection (1.4) shall
be deemed to commit the act or omission in Canada if paragraph (1.7)
(a), (b) or (c) applies in respect of the act or omission.
(1.6) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act, everyone
who, outside Canada, commits an act or omission that if committed
in Canada would constitute an offence against, a conspiracy or an
attempt to commit or being an accessory after the fact in relation to
an offence against, or any counselling in relation to an offence against,
(a) section 294, 298, 303 or 338 in relation to nuclear material,
(b) section 305 in respect of a threat to commit an offence against
section 294 or 303 in relation to nuclear material,
(c) section 381 in relation to a demand for nuclear material, or
(d) paragraph 243.5 (1) (a) or (b) in respect of a threat to use
nuclear material
shall be deemed to commit that act or omission in Canada if paragraph
(i.7) (a), (b) or (c) applies in respect of the act or omission.
(1.7) For the purposes of subsections (i.4) to (i.6), a person shall be
deemed to commit an act or omission in Canada if
(a) the act or omission is committed on a ship that is registered or
licensed, or for which an identification number has been issued, pur-
suant to any Act of Parliament,
(b) the act or omission is committed on an aircraft
(i) registered in Canada under regulations made under the Aero-
nautics Act, or
(ii) leased without crew and operated by a person who is qualified
under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act to be registered
as owner of an aircraft in Canada under such regulations; or
(c) the person who commits the act or omission is a Canadian citizen
or is, after the act or omission has been committed, present in Canada.
Several questions can be raised concerning these new provisions in
the Criminal Code. The Law Reform Commission argues" that the
Code provisions, like Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention, should have
taken two distinct steps. They should have created the offences in
one section as set down in Article 7 and then separately laid out the
bases of jurisdictions as in Article 8. The Commission views the all-
in-one section approach as confusing and also is uncertain whether
Canada has therefore fully implemented Article 7 of the Con-
vention.5 The Commission working paper reads:
50 Supra note 27, at 96-97.
51 Ibid.
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an Article 7 offence committed by an alien outside Canada but not on
board a Canadian ship or aircraft, would not be an offence under the
proposed subsections 6(1.4), (I.5) and (1.6) of the Criminal Code
unless the offender came to Canada after committing the offence. In
other words, incongruously, unless the offender came to Canada in such
a case there would be no offence and there would be no grounds for
extraditing the offender to Canada.
5 2
It is suggested by this writer that the new Code provisions go as
far as the Convention does. The "presence within the territory"
provision in Article 8(2) is implemented by Article 6(1.7)(c).
Under the Article 8 (2) convention regime Canada is obliged to take
measures to establish jurisdiction where the alleged offender is pres-
ent in its territory and it does not extradite him. This is the aut
dedere, aut judicare provision to ensure prosecution where a state
such as Canada has the alleged offender in custody but for some
reason cannot extradite to the requesting state. The Commission
seems to miss the point in its comments quoted above as to it being
incongruous that an alien committing an offence abroad that does
not relate to Canada in any way concerning export or import of
international nuclear materials could not be extradited to Canada.
It would be rather incongruous if he or she could be! In the absence
of the true universal principle whereby a state may seek to exercise
jurisdiction over all offences whoever commits them and wherever
they are committed and seek extradition on that basis, we are left
with a principle that does not go so far but rather rests on the fact
that if the offender enters a state party to the Convention after the
commission abroad of the offence that state will have jurisdiction
over the offence simply by the presence in its territory of the alleged
offender. The offence will only then be cognizable in that state and
the offence be deemed to have been committed within that state.
This concept of aut dedere, aut judicare is the crucial provision
in all the multilateral anti-terrorist Conventions." It is the provision
that seeks to stop the gap that would result if the alleged offender
were found in the territory of, for example, Canada, but extradition
were not possible. It seeks to maximize the possibilities for prosecu-
tion by states parties to the Convention. The Hostage-Taking Con-
vention54 is similar in approach and is similarly implemented in
section 6(1.3) (c) (g). However, unlike the Hostage-Taking Con-
52 Ibid., 97.
53 See supra notes 3, 4, 5, and 6.
54 Supra note 6, Art. 5(2).
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vention,55 the Nuclear Protection Convention56 does not indicate
that the decision to prosecute is to be considered by the competent
authorities in the state as in the case of only ordinary offence of
a grave nature under the law of that state. The concerns addressed
by the Law Reform Commission as to ships licensed in Canada and
aircraft leased to a person abroad qualified to be registered as an
owner in Canada can be voiced equally here. This writer's argu-
ments would be the same as given above in the section on hostage-
taking.57
One last controversy that the implementing sections of the Crim-
inal Code present are that section 6(1.5) (a) stipulates that a con-
spiracy entered into outside Canada to commit an act or omission
concerning nuclear material as provided in section 6(1.4) will be
deemed to have been committed in Canada if one of the bases of
jurisdiction listed in 6(1.7) is applicable. Section 6(1.6) similarly
indicates conspiracies. This section goes further than the Convention,
which in Article 7 provides only for attempts and participation in
the offence. It can be questioned whether this is therefore in accord-
ance with international law. A similar analysis can be made of the
hostage-taking offence contained in section 247(2) of the Criminal
Code and the applicable conspiracy provisions contained in sections
423(3) and (4) -The Hostage-Taking Convention does not provide
for conspiracy as an offence.
The Law Reform Commission states that this approach "may go
beyond the bounds of international law unless an overt act in further-
ence of the conspiracy takes place in Canada." This writer would
argue that even though not included in the Convention, Canada by
going beyond this Convention is acting responsibly and would be in
accordance with our general practice on conspiracy as set out in
section 423 of the Criminal Code. That section provides that it is
now an offence to conspire in Canada to commit an offence outside
Canada that is an offence under the laws of that place and to con-
spire outside Canada to commit an offence in Canada.5" Canada
sought here to prevent itself from being a planning base for criminal
activities in other states and to prevent people who may or may not
be Canadian citizens from planning offences abroad for execution
55 Ibid., Art. 6(2).
56 Supra note 7.
57 Supra, pp. 231-37.
58 Section 423 as am., by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 36.
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in Canada. It is not an offence to conspire outside Canada to com-
mit an offence outside Canada. The saving provision contained in
section 423 (6) to prevent double jeopardy or punishment provides
that if a person has been tried and convicted or acquitted abroad,
that shall be deemed a trial, conviction, or acquittal in Canada. A
similar provision appears specifically in section 6 (4). This is cer-
tainly in accordance with Canadian law and would not therefore
violate section x I (g) or section 7 of the Charter of Rights. The
question of prosecution for conspiracies to commit transnational
crimes in other states has been dealt with by the Supreme Court of
Canada to date without any problem.
It is unclear why the drafters of section 6(1.4), in seeking to lay
down acts or omissions relating to nuclear material that occur out-
side Canada as offences, did not mention the sections of the Criminal
Code that create the offences referred to in section 6 ( i .4). This was
the route taken in implementing the Internationally Protected
Persons Convention 1974" in section 6(i .2). Particular offences
should have been stipulated as now having extraterritorial effect
under section 6(1.4) .6" Does that section include the following:
death by criminal negligence (section 203); causing bodily harm by
criminal negligence (section 204); murder (section 212); mischief
causing actual danger to life (section 387(2)); mischief to public
property (section 387 (3)) ; and wilful damage to property (section
388) ? Section 6(1.4) must be read as incorporating these offences
for it to make any sense. However, it is likely that a person accused
of a nuclear material offence could successfully argue that section
6 (1.4) does not create any offences. The Law Reform Commission
recommends that section 6(1.4) should be amended to refer to
specific sections of the Criminal Code and also to other statutes as,
for example, the Atomic Energy Control Act."' It takes the position
that section 6 ( 1.4) does not define the offences with sufficient clarity
or certainty.
The last aspect of this matter is that section 6 (3) of the new Code
sections states that:
Where a person is alleged to have committed an act or omission that
is an offence by virtue of this section, proceedings in respect of that
offence may, whether or not that person is in Canada, be commenced
59 Supra note 5.
60 Supra note 27, at 98.
61 R.S.C. 1970, c. A-19.
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in any territorial division in Canada and the accused may be tried and
punished in respect of that offence in the same manner as if the offence
had been committed in that territorial division.
Can it be argued that this section is inconsistent with section 6 (1.3)
(f) and section 6 (1.7) (c) ? The Law Reform Commission would
seem to do so. 2 It argued that the words "whether or not that person
is in Canada" are confusing and appear to be inconsistent.6" As
stated earlier, section 6 (1.3) (f) dealing with hostage-taking and sec-
tion 6(1.7) (c) dealing with nuclear protection concern the basis of
jurisdiction relating to the presence of the offender in Canada after
the act or omission has been committed. This writer agrees with the
Commission that section 6 (3) is a trifle confusing, but it is not incon-
sistent. The aim of the section is to enable proceedings to commence
regardless of the location of the alleged offender. This provision
would allow the laying of an information or the preferring of an
indictment regarding an accused who is now outside Canada, there-
by facilitating extradition as it is necessary before an extradition
request is made for a charge to have been laid in the requesting
state.64 Section 6(3) clearly does not allow trial and sentencing of
the accused in Canada in absentia. That would surely be in violation
of section 7 of the Charter of Rights.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is a fact of life that the more states parties to all
these anti-terrorist conventions, the better the chance of success.
Progress will be made only when there is a complete lack of safe
haven and sympathetic states. A good sign is the slow but steady
progress of states acceding to the conventions, which bodes well for
the future, as long as the states parties live up to their manifold ob-
ligations. Canada's implementation of the Hostage-Taking and
Nuclear Material Conventions is a fine example to all other states.
The reduction of safe havens and the use of wide bases of juris-
diction over the offence, coupled with proper use of the aut dedere,
aut judicare articles in the Conventions, should be a deterrent to
possible future terrorists. Perhaps the will may be present to formu-
late a new convention that deals with matters not addressed in the
62 Supra note 26, at 99.
683 Ibid.
6 A similar amendment in the 1985 Act may be found in s. 423(5) re con-
spiracy to commit offences.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985 245
aforementioned conventions. Such a convention could look to the
other types of offences listed in the European Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorism, 5 such as offences involving the use of
bombs, grenades, rockets, automatic firearms, and letter or parcel
bombs. Deterrence naturally will only occur in cases where individ-
uals concerned do care about their own safety and freedom from
incarceration. In cases where the terrorist aim is publicity and indiv-
idual safety is rated at zero, the deterrent factor, unfortunately, will
rate low.
85 1977, E.T.S. No. 97.
Sommaire
Loi de 1985 modifiant le droit penal
L'article traite des dispositions de la Loi de 1985 modifiant le droit
penal adopte afin de mettre en oeuvre la Convention de 1979 con-
cernant la prise d'otages et la Convention de 198o sur la protection du
matiriel nucliaire. Ces deux conventions ont pour objet d'emp~cher
tout acte de terrorisme. Ainsi les Aftats partis ei ces deux conventions
(de mgme que pour les Conventions sur le ditournement des avions
et d'autres offences contre l'aviation civile et les attentats contre les
personnes internationalement prot~gjes, y compris le personnel diplo-
matique) s'engagent a s'assurer qu'il existe dans leur droit interne de
larges bases de juridiction sur des offences donnies et s'engagent a
extrader ces personnes s'ils ne se chargent pas de les poursuivre
directement (aut dedere, aut judicare).
